European imports from Russia’s Yamal LNG project rose to a record in the first half of 2026, exposing the distance between the EU’s political commitment to end Russian energy dependence and the commercial reality of its gas market.
EU member states imported 9.89 million tonnes of LNG from the Novatek-operated Arctic project between January and June, an increase of 18% from the same period in 2025. That implies first-half imports of roughly 8.38 million tonnes a year earlier and an additional 1.51 million tonnes entering the European market in the latest six-month period.
The concentration of purchases was striking. France imported approximately 3.6 million tonnes, Belgium 2.9 million tonnes and Spain 2.7 million tonnes. Together, the three countries accounted for around 9.2 million tonnes, or almost 93% of the reported EU total.
European buyers spent an estimated €6 billion on Yamal LNG during the period. That represents an implied average expenditure of approximately €607 per tonne, although the figure includes differences in contractual terms, delivery timing and cargo valuation.
The increase reflects the continuing commercial importance of European terminals to Yamal LNG. European buyers retain long-term contractual obligations, while LNG infrastructure in France, Belgium and Spain provides access to large storage facilities, liquid gas markets and onward transmission capacity.
Under the current restrictions, Russian LNG can continue to enter the EU through existing long-term contracts, but new short-term agreements are no longer permitted. Customs authorities are expected to verify that imported cargoes comply with these conditions.
The regulatory position becomes more restrictive from 1 January 2027, when the EU plans to prohibit imports under existing long-term LNG contracts as well. Russian pipeline gas is also expected to face a later prohibition, placing greater pressure on European buyers to replace both contracted LNG volumes and remaining pipeline supply.
The record first-half imports may therefore represent a period of accelerated contractual lifting before the restrictions take effect. Buyers have an incentive to secure volumes while contracts remain legally executable, particularly where alternative LNG procurement would expose them to higher spot prices, greater shipping costs or less flexible delivery terms.
The shift will affect more than Russian suppliers. Replacement demand will have to be met through additional Atlantic and Middle Eastern LNG, pipeline imports from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan, storage optimisation and lower consumption. Southeast Europe will be affected through competition for cargoes delivered to Greece, Turkey, Croatia and the wider Mediterranean market.
European gas security is consequently entering a transition in which infrastructure availability is no longer the main constraint. The more difficult issue is replacing commercially embedded supply contracts without creating a new price premium for European industry and power generation.
