Guarantees of Origin became a quietly decisive layer of the January energy landscape in South-East Europe, not because they drove spot power prices directly, but because they increasingly determine who can monetise low-carbon attributes in a system where physical power prices are shaped by flexibility and constraints rather than fuel alone. January confirmed that GOs in SEE are no longer a peripheral compliance instrument; they are evolving into a separate value stack that interacts with hydro, nuclear, wind, and cross-border flows in a way that increasingly matters for utilities, industrial buyers, and exporters.
At a structural level, SEE remains a net exporter of low-carbon attributes, but with sharp internal asymmetries. Countries with large hydro and nuclear fleets—primarily Bulgaria and Romania—generate a surplus of potential GOs relative to domestic voluntary demand, while countries with limited certification depth, fragmented registries, or high industrial offtake—such as Serbia and Montenegro—remain structurally short certified green attributes even when they are not short physical power.
January reinforced this split. Physical power prices spiked during evening ramps, yet GO prices remained comparatively stable, signalling that carbon and origin scarcity did not coincide with energy scarcity. This decoupling is critical. It shows that January’s €200–300/MWh peak hours were priced on flexibility and congestion, not on the availability of certified renewable or nuclear output. As a result, GO markets behaved more like a slow-moving structural instrument than a volatile spot commodity.
Hydropower dominated the January GO supply profile in the Western Balkans. Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina generated the bulk of their certifiable renewable output from hydro assets, which continued to issue GOs regardless of whether water was dispatched into peak hours or conserved. This is an important distinction: hydro operators monetised energy volatility on exchanges such as SEEPEX while simultaneously monetising attribute value through GOs in a completely separate channel. The two revenue streams were only loosely correlated. Even on days when hydro withheld energy and prices spiked, GO issuance continued at a steady pace, reinforcing the stability of GO supply.
Wind and solar contributed incremental GO volumes, but January’s seasonal profile meant solar GOs were limited and wind GOs episodic. This mattered less for absolute volumes than for perception. Corporate buyers increasingly distinguish between “hydro-heavy” and “wind- or solar-specific” GOs, particularly multinational offtakers with hourly or granular matching ambitions. January wind volatility therefore translated into temporal mismatches rather than outright GO shortages, a problem for advanced buyers but not for standard annual matching.
Nuclear GOs were the most strategically significant element of the January market. Bulgaria and Romania’s nuclear fleets issued large volumes of low-carbon GOs that are increasingly attractive to industrial buyers seeking 24/7 clean power matching or firm baseload decarbonisation claims. While nuclear does not qualify as renewable, nuclear GOs are becoming a preferred instrument for heavy industry that values firmness over intermittency. In January, nuclear GOs quietly capped the upside of renewable GO prices in the region by offering a scalable, stable alternative for buyers prioritising emissions intensity rather than technology purity.
This dynamic matters particularly for exporters. Bulgarian and Romanian utilities exporting physical power into neighbouring markets also exported, implicitly or explicitly, the option to source GOs from their domestic registries. Even when power flowed physically into Serbia or Croatia, GO flows followed contractual and registry pathways rather than electrons. This reinforced a growing reality: physical imports do not guarantee green attributes, and January exposed the cost of that gap for industrial buyers facing ESG, CBAM, or customer-driven decarbonisation requirements.
Serbia’s position illustrates the tension. Physically, Serbia sits at the centre of SEE flows and cleared January without systemic energy shortage. From a GO perspective, however, domestic issuance remains dominated by hydro and is insufficient to cover rising voluntary demand from export-oriented industry. As a result, Serbian buyers increasingly rely on imported GOs—often from Bulgaria or Romania—creating a price premium unrelated to local power prices. January’s volatility in SEEPEX did not materially change this premium, underlining that GO pricing is driven by structural certification imbalance, not short-term market stress.
Montenegro faces an even starker version of the same issue. Despite being overwhelmingly hydro-based in physical terms, its limited market size and registry liquidity mean that GO availability and tradability remain constrained. January’s extreme price dispersion on MEPX had almost no impact on GO values, but it highlighted a strategic gap: a system can be green in physics and still green-poor in certification if registry depth and offtake channels are weak.
For corporate and industrial buyers, January delivered a clear signal. Spot power volatility does not translate into GO opportunity. Buyers who delayed GO procurement hoping that €60–70/MWh baseload days would coincide with cheaper green attributes were disappointed. GO prices remained anchored to longer-term scarcity, particularly for hydro and nuclear certificates with firm delivery profiles. The rational strategy in SEE is therefore decoupled procurement: manage energy price risk and GO risk separately, with different timing and counterparties.
From a policy and market-design perspective, January underscores that Guarantees of Origin are becoming a parallel market infrastructure, not an accessory. As hourly matching, CBAM-adjacent reporting, and Scope-2 scrutiny intensify, the value of firm, traceable, and regionally recognised GOs will rise regardless of spot power behaviour. Systems with nuclear and large hydro will continue to monetise this advantage. Systems without will pay a structural premium, even in months where physical power is abundant.
January did not produce a GO price shock. Instead, it confirmed something more important: the separation of energy scarcity from origin scarcity is now a defining feature of South-East Europe’s electricity economy. Those who understand and price that separation correctly will outperform those who still treat GOs as an afterthought to power procurement.
By virtu.energy
