The most recent capacity auctions for the Vertical Gas Corridor once again highlighted the growing mismatch between political ambition and market reality. Despite being promoted as a strategic energy link connecting Greece with Ukraine, the corridor attracted virtually no commercial interest from gas traders.
Out of nearly 72 GWh of transport capacity offered for February, only 48 MWh was booked—an amount widely dismissed by market participants as statistically insignificant. Limited interest was observed solely on the route transporting gas from the Revythoussa LNG terminal or the Alexandroupoli FSRU through Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova toward Ukraine. In contrast, the two alternative pathways starting from Alexandroupoli—via the IGB interconnector and the TAP pipeline—received no bids at all.
Participation in the auction was confined to a test-level submission by Metlen and a single foreign trading company, reinforcing the view that commercial players remain unconvinced by the corridor’s economic rationale. This outcome stands in sharp contrast to official narratives portraying the Vertical Gas Corridor as a pillar of regional energy security and a future gateway for US LNG flows into Eastern Europe.
Market fundamentals played decisively against the project. Ukraine, the intended end buyer, focused on securing the cheapest available gas, while intermediaries favored alternative routes with stronger margins, especially amid tight winter demand across the region.
Although the EU has designated the Vertical Gas Corridor as a priority energy project and reiterated its commitment to phasing out Russian gas, concrete support has remained limited. Instead, EU authorities are examining whether the corridor’s auction products comply with existing regulatory frameworks, following complaints from market participants.
Greek officials and industry stakeholders increasingly acknowledge that the corridor cannot achieve commercial viability without financial support as long as Russian gas continues to be part of Europe’s supply mix. Looking beyond 2027, the route may assume a secondary role as alternative corridors reach capacity constraints, but until then it is likely to remain a strategic asset with minimal market appeal, rather than a truly competitive transit option.
