Serbia’s planned gas interconnector with North Macedonia is frequently presented as a milestone in the country’s energy diversification strategy. Framed politically as a southern gateway to new suppliers and symbolically aligned with broader European diversification goals, the project is often discussed in optimistic terms. Yet beneath the surface, the southern corridor introduces a complex set of structural, commercial, and geopolitical exposures that raise a fundamental question: does this route materially reduce Serbia’s supply risk, or does it simply redistribute it across a longer and more fragile chain of dependencies?
The proposed Serbia–North Macedonia gas pipeline is designed to connect Serbia’s transmission system with the southern Balkan gas network, linking indirectly to infrastructure in Greece and Turkey. In theory, this opens access to gas arriving via the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, LNG terminals in Greece, and volumes transiting through Turkey from the Caspian region. In practice, however, Serbia would sit at the downstream end of a corridor already heavily utilised, increasingly contested, and structurally shaped by actors whose priorities do not necessarily align with Serbian demand stability or price predictability.
One of the key constraints of the southern corridor is volume availability. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline was never designed as a high-capacity system capable of serving large incremental demand across the Balkans. Its primary function is to deliver Azerbaijani gas to Italy, with limited spare capacity available for secondary markets. As regional demand rises, particularly in Greece, Bulgaria, and potentially North Macedonia itself, the amount of gas that could realistically flow northward toward Serbia becomes uncertain. Serbia would not be competing in an open market alone; it would be competing with EU member states that often enjoy stronger regulatory leverage and, in some cases, priority access.
Transit dependency further complicates the equation. Gas imported via North Macedonia would rely on uninterrupted flows through multiple jurisdictions, each with its own regulatory framework, tariff regime, and political exposure. Unlike a direct bilateral pipeline, the southern route introduces several potential points of friction, from regulatory bottlenecks to capacity allocation disputes. Even short disruptions or tariff adjustments along the route could materially affect delivered prices in Serbia, particularly during peak winter demand.
Cost dynamics also deserve close scrutiny. Gas arriving via the southern corridor typically carries higher transportation and system charges than gas delivered through shorter, more direct routes. These costs accumulate as gas moves through multiple transmission systems, each applying regulated fees. While such costs may be manageable when gas prices are low, they become increasingly significant during periods of market stress. For Serbia’s industrial sector, which is highly sensitive to input cost volatility, this raises concerns about competitiveness and inflationary pressure.
Another critical issue is upstream concentration. While the southern corridor is often described as diversified, much of the gas flowing through it originates from a limited number of sources. Azerbaijani gas dominates non-Russian volumes in the region, and while politically attractive, it represents a different form of concentration rather than true diversification. Dependence on a single upstream producer, even if geopolitically preferable, still exposes Serbia to supply negotiations, pricing leverage, and production risks beyond its control.
Turkey’s role as a transit and balancing hub further complicates Serbia’s southern exposure. Turkey has increasingly positioned itself as a regional gas broker, blending imports from Russia, Azerbaijan, LNG suppliers, and domestic storage. While this creates flexibility for Turkey, it also introduces opacity for downstream buyers. Serbia would be purchasing gas that may be physically or commercially aggregated, making transparency around origin, pricing components, and long-term availability harder to secure.
There is also the issue of competing strategic priorities. For Greece and Turkey, southern gas infrastructure is part of broader national energy strategies that prioritise domestic security, export revenues, and regional influence. Serbia, as a downstream consumer without direct control over upstream infrastructure, risks becoming a price taker rather than a strategic participant. In tight market conditions, this asymmetry becomes especially pronounced.
From a system resilience perspective, the southern corridor improves route diversity but does little to improve market optionality unless paired with flexible contracting and access to storage. Without the ability to arbitrage between multiple hubs or store gas during low-price periods, Serbia’s exposure to short-term volatility remains high. Infrastructure alone cannot compensate for limited commercial flexibility.
In this light, the Serbia–North Macedonia interconnector should be viewed less as a solution and more as a conditional option. Its value depends entirely on how Serbia integrates it into a broader portfolio of supply routes, contracts, and market access tools. Used sparingly and strategically, it can enhance resilience. Relied upon too heavily, it risks embedding Serbia in a complex transit chain with limited control and elevated cost exposure.
The southern corridor is not a failure of diversification, but it is not diversification by default. For Serbia, the challenge lies in resisting the temptation to treat physical connection as strategic autonomy. True security lies not in the number of pipelines, but in the balance of leverage they provide.
